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INTRODUCTION
Gideon v. Wainwright1 is more than a “landmark” Supreme Court ruling
in the field of constitutional criminal procedure.2 As evidenced by the range
of celebrators of Gideon’s Fiftieth Anniversary (extending far beyond the
legal academy)3 and Gideon’s inclusion in the basic coverage of high school
government courses,4 Gideon today is an icon of the American justice system.
I have no quarrel with that iconic status, but I certainly did not see any such
potential in Gideon when I analyzed the Court’s ruling shortly after it was
announced in March of 1963. I had previously agreed to write an article for
the Supreme Court Review’s coverage of the Court’s 1962–63 term. Phillip
Kurland, the Review’s editor, made Gideon my assignment, noting that the
Court during that term had decided numerous constitutional criminal
procedure cases and Gideon clearly was the most prominent of those rulings.
As my research progressed, I came to the conclusion that Gideon was more
significant as a case study in the crafting of an opinion that overruled a
previous decision (Gideon had overruled Betts v. Brady5) than as a
contribution to the field of constitutional criminal procedure. Indeed, as I
noted in the introduction to my article on Gideon and the “art of
overruling,”6 Gideon appeared to have less doctrinal and practical
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). I have commented more extensively on
Gideon and other right-to-counsel cases in two sources that will be cited throughout this article:
Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Art of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, and 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 11.1.10 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter CRIMPROC], available at Westlaw.
2. The “landmark” designation might suggest a very exclusive club, but dozens of
criminal procedure rulings have been admitted to membership if the test is frequent
commentator description of a decision as a “landmark” ruling. My November 1, 2013 search of
the Westlaw database for law reviews, texts, and bar journals indicates that three Supreme Court
decisions from the 196263 term alone have been described as “landmark” criminal procedure
rulings in more than twenty publications. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(eighty-three publications in Westlaw search results); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (twentynine publications—referring to the status of Fay at the time of decision and not today, as it was
later overruled); Gideon, 373 U.S. 335 (403 publications). This is not to suggest that all
landmarks are equal. In casebooks, landmarks often become reduced to note cases, but Gideon
at year 50 has escaped that fate. Whether it will retain that status as long as Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), remains to be seen.
3. See, e.g., Consulate Celebrates 50th Anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, CONSULATE GEN.
U.S. SHANGHAI - CHINA, http://shanghai.usembassy-china.org.cn/033012gideon.html (last visited
May 20, 2014); Gideon v. Wainwright—Case Providing Defendants an Attorney—Turns 50, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-33816_162-57574701; Bill Mears,
‘Gideon’ at 50 and the Right to Counsel: Their Words, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/
justice/Gideon-own-words (last visited May 20, 2014).
4. See, e.g., COLORADO MODEL CONTENT STANDARDS: CIVICS 13 (1998), available at
http://www.lawanddemocracy.org/pdffiles/civics.pdf; United States Era 9, NAT’L CENTER HIST.
SCHS., http://www.nchs.ucla.edu/Standards/us-history-content-standards/us-era-9-1 (last visited
May 20, 2014).
5. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
6. See Israel, supra note 1, at 211 n.1.
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significance than two other criminal procedure rulings decided on the same
day—Douglas v. California7 and Fay v. Noia.8 This Essay recounts the analysis
that led me to view Gideon in 1963 as an important, but limited, decision—
certainly not one destined to be an all-time landmark ruling.
The Gideon extension of the state’s obligation to provide appointed
counsel for indigent defendants struck me in 1963 as not nearly as
significant as other recent developments in the rapidly expanding
constitutional regulation of the state criminal justice processes—in
particular Mapp v. Ohio’s application of the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule to the states.9 Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady, which had
held that the state’s obligation to provide appointed counsel was limited to
instances in which the special circumstances of the case required counsel’s
assistance in order to gain a fair trial.10 Overruling Betts in 1963 did not
mean as much as it would have if done shortly after Betts was decided in
1942. In the intervening years, the Court had recognized that appointment
was required in all capital cases (the potential of the death penalty
apparently constituting a per se special circumstance).11 In non-capital felony
cases, “special circumstances” had come to include some very common
circumstances.12 Appointment of counsel had been required simply because
the prosecution was brought under a statute that could present
interpretative issues as to its coverage,13 or trial proceedings offered an
opportunity to raise an objection or pursue a strategy that could not readily
be evaluated by a layperson.14 Thus, a leading casebook, in adding the

7. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (discussed in CRIMPROC, supra note 1,
§ 11.1(d)).
8. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (discussed in CRIMPROC, supra note 1, §§ 28.3(b),
28.4(b)). Gideon had received considerable public attention because it overruled Betts, but apart
from a “handful of states,” prosecutors were more likely to be concerned about the impact of
the other two cases. Israel, supra note 1, at 212–13. Douglas imposed an appointment
requirement that currently was met by “[o]nly a handful of states,” and Noia had dramatically
expanded federal habeas review of state convictions by allowing review of constitutional claims
forfeited in state proceedings, provided counsel had not engaged in a deliberate bypass in
failing to raise the claim there. Id. at 213 & nn.8–9.
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 3.1(a).
10. Betts, 316 U.S. at 471–72.
11. See Israel, supra note 1, at 249–50. Justice Clark joined in the overruling of Betts on the
ground that having a lesser standard for non-capital cases was inconsistent with the thrust of his
opinion for the Court in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), rejecting
such a distinction in the application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the trial of civil
dependents of military personnel for overseas offenses. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
348–49 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring).
12. See Israel, supra note 1, at 251–61.
13. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962).
14. Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 701–04 (1960).
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Gideon case to its 1963 supplement, asked: “After Chewning v. Cunningham
what was left of Betts v. Brady to overrule?”15
As Justice Harlan noted in his Gideon concurrence,16 the state court
rulings applying Betts had often failed to take into account this broad
reading of special circumstances. Thus, the practical impact of Gideon, in
flatly rejecting Betts, had the potential to be substantially greater than the
limited doctrinal extension of the constitutional right. However, by 1963,
only five states were regularly relying on Betts.17 The remainder, as a matter
of state law or state practice, were regularly appointing counsel in at least all
felony cases (and Gideon presented only a felony case18).
The limited practical and doctrinal impact of the Gideon holding did
not necessarily define Gideon’s place in the rapidly expanding field of
constitutional criminal procedure. Gideon might be assigned far greater
significance as a result of the implications of that decision for issues that
went beyond the overruling of Betts. Before deciding against writing about
Gideon’s contributions to constitutional criminal procedure, I explored what
Gideon might contribute to the resolution of a series of these other issues.19
The issues I considered were: (1) the relationship of Fourteenth
Amendment due process to the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights;
(2) the expansion of constitutional regulation to eliminate distinctions
based on indigence in the administration of the criminal justice process; and
(3) a series of questions relating to the interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.20 My conclusion was that Gideon offered very

15. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR & JESSE H. CHOPER, 1963 SUPPLEMENT TO
DODD’S CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 579 (1963) (citation omitted); see also The Supreme
Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 75, 115 (1962) (“After Chewning, little may be left of Betts
. . . . It would seem preferable for the Court squarely to overrule Betts.”).
16. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. See Israel, supra note 1, at 267. The Brief for Petitioner stressed that only five states
would be impacted by overruling Betts, and even there, some counties regularly appointed
counsel in felony cases. “The task here,” it noted, “is essentially a modest one: to bring into line
with the consensus of the states and professional opinion the few stragglers who persist in
denying fair treatment to the accused.” Brief for the Petitioner at 32, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No.
155), 1962 WL 115120, at *32. Of course, retroactive application would impact other states
that had only recently moved to regular appointment and still had incarcerated felony
defendants who had not been provided counsel. See Israel, supra note 1, at 212 n.7.
18. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
19. I was not alone in viewing Gideon’s substantive significance as primarily related to still
unsettled issues. See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 79, 103–05 (1963)
(discussing briefly of why the “decision in Gideon was not unexpected,” followed by a discussion
of two open issues—whether Gideon would be applied retroactively and whether the right to
appointed counsel would extend to misdemeanor cases).
20. One issue I did not consider was the bearing of Gideon on originalism in constitutional
interpretation. Betts v. Brady had taken into account the historical distinction between the right
to utilize retained counsel and the state’s obligation to provide counsel. See Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 466–67 (1942). Johnson v. Zerbst, however, had not addressed that distinction in
recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
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little direction on these issues, certainly not enough to justify an article on
the substantive contributions of Gideon. In reconstructing the reasoning that
led me to that conclusion, I may be influenced by the Supreme Court’s later
opinions addressing those issues, but my recollection is reinforced by some
skimpy notes that I retained and some occasional comments on those issues
in the footnotes of my Supreme Court Review article.
I.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ISSUE

Betts v. Brady was a paradigm of the application of the traditional
“fundamental fairness” analysis in assessing the relationship between a Bill of
Rights guarantee and Fourteenth Amendment due process, emphasizing
particularly “federalism concerns.” Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in
Gideon, in contrast to Betts, appeared to hold that Fourteenth Amendment
due process made the Sixth Amendment right to counsel fully applicable to
the states. Its conclusion, that the Sixth Amendment right was fundamental
and therefore applicable to the states, was consistent with acceptance of the
Palko view of traditional “fundamental fairness” analysis (as Justice Harlan
argued in his concurring opinion21), although it could also reflect
application of the selective incorporation doctrine that had been recently

(1938). Thus, the amicus brief for the 22 states urging the overruling of Betts criticized Betts’
historical argument as inconsistent with Johnson’s reading of the Sixth Amendment; see also Brief
for the State Government Amici Curiae at 5–6, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL
115122, at *5–6. See also Brief for the Petitioner at 18–19, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962
WL 115120, at *18–19.
In the commentary, only Judge Henry Friendly challenged Johnson for its inconsistency with
the original purpose of the Sixth Amendment, and he acknowledged that the Court’s “sound”
result could have been achieved under due process. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 944–45 (1965). Justice Black has occasionally
been described as an “originalist,” but he focused primarily on what he viewed as the “plain
meaning” of the text. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, §§ 2.8(a) n.17, 2.9(c) n.46. The application
of his textual reasoning could readily have produced the following analysis: the Sixth
Amendment nowhere conditions the guarantees of the accused on the accused’s ability to pay
the costs associated with the implementation of those guarantees; the right of compulsory
process is not dependent on being able to pay witness fees and right to jury trial is not
conditioned on the ability to reimburse the court for juror fees and other juror costs; nothing
in the language of the Sixth Amendment justifies a different treatment of the right to the
assistance of counsel. This would be consistent with Justice Black’s approach in analyzing other
constitutional provisions. See generally HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1968); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960).
21. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion did not reject the possibility that the right to
counsel under due process had the same scope as the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring). He argued against a position that
would “automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the
states.” Id. The fundamental fairness ruling cited by Justice Harlan, Palko v. Connecticut,
recognized that a particular guarantee could be fully “absorbed” by the Due Process Clause
(although it held that was not the case as to the double jeopardy clause). Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253,
302–08 (1982); CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 2.5(c).

A9_ISRAEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2040

6/23/2014 8:47 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2035

urged by Justice Brennan.22 Considering the ambiguous description of the
relationship between due process and the guarantees of the Bill of Rights in
Justice Black’s opinion, the diverse positions on incorporation that had been
advanced by several of the Justices who joined Justice Black’s opinion,23 and
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, I concluded that Gideon reached a result
consistent with the adoption of Justice Brennan’s selective incorporation
analysis, but fell short of clearly adopting that position. Gideon was not the
landmark opinion that established that procedural guarantees found in the
Bill of Rights could no longer be held to be fundamental (and therefore
applicable to the states) only in some aspects, as opposed to being applied
fully to the states under the same standards applied to the federal criminal
justice process. That ruling arguably came one year later in Malloy v.
Hogan,24 although it was in Duncan v. Louisiana,25 decided five years later,
that the Court fully explored its application of the selective incorporation
doctrine. Subsequent discussions of the selective incorporation doctrine

22. See Israel, supra note 21, at 253. The conference notes on Gideon, reproduced in THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985) 502–03 (Del Dickinson ed., 2001), indicate that
Justice Brennan viewed Gideon as a selective incorporation case, as he referred to incorporation
and to his article on selective incorporation. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 768–69 (1961). Justice Stewart, who also joined Justice Black’s
opinion, expressly rejected incorporation. The reconstructed conference notes (based on the
papers of Justices Douglas and Brennan) offer the following summary of Justice Stewart’s
position: “Due Process requires that a man be represented by counsel if he is to have a fair trial.
I would not ‘incorporate’ or ‘absorb’ the Sixth into the Fourteenth Amendment. There are no
circumstances when the absence of counsel can produce a fair trial. I reverse.” THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra, at 503. Justice Stewart did not find it necessary to join Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion insofar as it rejected any version of incorporation, although he
later joined Justice Harlan’s opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, which challenged the majority’s
explicit adoption of incorporation. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Although both supported Gideon’s rejection of Bett’s special circumstances rule,
Justices Stewart and Harlan did so on different grounds. Justice Stewart apparently concluded
that counsel was always needed to ensure a fair trial. Justice Harlan did not, as he made clear in
the oral argument. Oral Argument, Part 2 at 26:50, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (No.
155), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_155 (responding to the
argument of J. Lee Rankin, Justice Harlan originally notes that there are cases in which lawyers
would agree that “the best thing that a client could do . . . is go and try his case himself,” and
then adds, “to make a sweeping generalization as a dogmatic . . . assertion that there can be no
fair trial without a counsel ignores the facts of life that everybody—lawyer knows”). However,
Justice Harlan was willing to apply an absolute requirement of appointment to avoid the
administrative difficulties posed by a special circumstances standard—supporting a ruling that
has been characterized as “prophylactic” in nature. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring); CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.1(a) n.24 .
23. For a more extensive analysis of each of these elements, see Israel, supra note 21, at
29295.
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964); see also Israel, supra note 21, at 295–97.
25. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 2.6(a)
n.28, (c).
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have concentrated on Duncan, not Gideon,26 and it is Duncan, rather than
Gideon, that achieved prominence in large part because of its relationship to
that doctrine.
II. INDIGENT EQUALITY
The briefs in Gideon, with good reason, addressed the question of
whether Betts produced a ruling that was inconsistent with the subsequent
decision in Griffin v. Illinois.27 The Griffin Court, relying in part on the Equal
Protection Clause, held unconstitutional—as applied to an indigent—a state
practice conditioning appellate review upon presenting a stenographic
transcript of lower court proceedings (which the indigent could not afford
to purchase). Griffin’s equality analysis had been extended to various other
contexts, but always to invalidate state prerequisites to access to the judicial
process.28 Commentators had questioned whether that principle would be
extended to providing to the indigent the resources needed to take
advantage of that access.29 Still, the Griffin plurality opinion by Justice Black
had included that famous generality: “There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”30
Relying in part on that statement, previous briefs had argued that the
“Griffin principle” had implicitly rejected the Betts analysis and automatically
26. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 2.6(a) & n.1 (collecting articles discussing selective
incorporation). However, both Don Dripps and Tracy Meares have brought attention to
Gideon’s reliance on an incorporationist approach, arguing that the Court limited effective
future development of the right to counsel by focusing on the Sixth Amendment rather than
the more flexible standard of due process. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE
117–18, 152–55 (2003); Tracy L. Meares, What’s Wrong With Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215,
223–24 (2003).
27. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36–38 (1956). Three key Gideon briefs argued in favor
of overturning Betts. Brief for the Petitioner at 25–28, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355
(1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 115120, at *25–28; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union
and the Florida Civil Liberties Union, Amici Curiae at 26–29, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
355 (1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 115121, at *26–29; Brief for the State Government Amici
Curiae at 12–13, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 115122, at
*12–13. Discussions with fellow clerks during the 1959–60 and 1960–61 terms, when I clerked
for Justice Stewart, led me to believe that many of the Justices did not read amicus briefs,
leaving that task to the clerks. The ACLU and State Government briefs, however, were almost
certainly given more attention. The ACLU participated in oral argument, so its brief surely
would have been read by the Justices in preparing for that argument. The State Government
Brief was discussed in oral argument by petitioner’s counsel, Abe Fortas. See Oral Argument,
Part 2, supra note 22, at 33:08. The Court was obviously interested in the position taken by
states other than Florida, as evidenced by its decision also to allow Alabama to participate in the
oral argument.
28. Rulings extending Griffin related to fees and transcripts, where indigents were either
denied access to posttrial proceedings or limited as to the contentions they could raise. See
CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.2(d).
29. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 1, 246 & n.202 (collecting articles); CRIMPROC, supra note
1, § 11.1(d).
30. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
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required appointment of trial counsel for the indigent.31 The petitioner’s
brief for Gideon followed the same path. It argued that denial of counsel
“violates both due process and equal protection,” citing in support the
“principle . . . articulated in Griffin v. Illinois.”32 The brief for Florida
challenged the extension of equal protection analysis, arguing that “the
Griffin case does not require that states take affirmative action to equalize
economic conditions” and to so hold “would open a veritable ‘Pandora’s
Box.’”33
The Supreme Court in the 1962 term did extend the Griffin analysis to
require the provision of counsel for the indigent, but that didn’t come in
Gideon. Douglas v. California, decided the same day as Gideon, relied in part
on equal protection to hold unconstitutional a California practice of
refusing to appoint counsel for an indigent seeking appellate review where
the appellate court, after a preliminary review of the trial record, concluded
“no good whatsoever could be served” by adding the input of counsel.34 The
Gideon opinion did not cite to Douglas or Griffin, or mention equal
protection. Justice Black did note that the criminal justice system enshrined
in “our state and national constitutions” sought to “assure fair trials . . . in
which every defendant stands equal before the law,” and that “[t]his noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man . . . has to face his accusers without
a lawyer to assist him.”35 The opinion added that “any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.”36
Even with the above statements, the Gideon opinion’s “equality” focus
was limited. It did not stress the need for the process to treat the indigent
and the non-indigent equally. Rather, the focus was on the general

31. See Brief for the Petitioner at 3944, Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962)
(No. 63), 1961 WL 102331, at *39–44; Brief for the Petitioner at 2326, Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506 (1962) (No. 158), 1961 WL 101650, *23–26; Brief for Petitioner at 2327,
Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (No. 466), 1960 WL 98415, at *23–27. In
Hudson and Chewning, the briefs presented the contention as resting entirely on equal
protection, rather than a combination of equal protection and due process—the rationale
advanced in the Gideon briefs. Thus, the Chewning brief argued that petitioner was entitled
under equal protection to appointed counsel in a recidivist trial “because Virginia law allows
counsel in recidivist trials for defendants who are financially able to obtain counsel.” Brief for
the Petitioner at 40, Chewning, 368 U.S. 443 (No. 63).
32. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 2526.
33. Brief for Respondent at 5253, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No.
155), 1963 WL 105476, at *52–53. Justice White apparently was persuaded by this argument.
See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (19401985), supra note 22, at 504 (“[Justice] White:
Equal protection of the laws would apply in civil cases and would require a lawyer where the
state is a litigant . . . .”)
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting People v. Douglas, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
36. Id.
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applicability of the fair trial requirement (also the theme of Johnson v.
Zerbst), without regard to the defendant’s financial status.37 The opinion did
not articulate a broader requirement of giving the indigent equal ability to
utilize elements of the process that are not required by due process. Every
state criminal justice process includes procedures through which a
defendant may obtain an advantageous result that go beyond the procedural
prerequisites for a fair trial. A broad equality requirement would ensure that
the indigent had the means to take advantage of the most important of
those procedures. Unlike Gideon, Douglas addressed such a procedure. Due
process did not require appellate review, but Douglas required that the
indigent be given counsel to take advantage of the equal protection access to
such review already guaranteed by Griffin.38
As between Gideon and Douglas, with respect to the development of an
equality principle, Douglas appeared to me to be the more significant case,
both in doctrine and practical impact. Douglas’ reliance on Griffin’s analysis
provided a far more significant doctrinal development. Also, the Douglas
ruling would impact far more states than Gideon. As I noted in my Supreme
Court Review article, “only a handful of states, if that many, follow[ed] a
practice that [met] the requirements of Douglas.”39 An article addressing the
equality issue therefore would have to be more about Douglas than Gideon.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
Application of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the states was
certain to present constitutional questions that had not yet been resolved in
the application of that Amendment solely to the federal system. I considered
writing about Gideon and the future development of the Sixth Amendment.
In that connection, I prepared a list of key issues: (a) what level or type of
charge will give rise to the duty to appoint counsel; (b) when does a person
become entitled to appointment, and how does that bear on access to
counsel thereafter at each stage in the process; (c) will the Sixth
Amendment right extend to providing funding for persons with special
expertise who might assist counsel; and (d) how will the Court develop the
concept of “effective assistance,” which had been viewed as an aspect of the
constitutional right to counsel. My conclusion was that the Gideon opinion
offered limited direction as to the first issue and basically no direction as to
the other three.

37. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
38. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.1(d) & nn.10716 (discussing the subsequent
retreat from Douglas’ equal protection analysis in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
39. Israel, supra note 1, at 213 n.9.
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A. OFFENSE LEVEL
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Gideon sought to limit the ruling
there to the prosecution for “offenses which . . . carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence” (i.e., a “serious criminal charge”),40 but Justice
Black’s opinion for the Court contained no such limitation. It repeatedly
described the right to counsel by reference to the language of the Sixth
Amendment—the right of an “accused” in a “criminal prosecution.”41
However, the opinion did not address the meaning of the term “criminal” as
used in “criminal prosecution.” Were all charges placed on the state’s
“criminal” docket therefore criminal accusations for the purposes of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel? The exemption of petty offenses under
the Jury Clause had been brought to the Court’s attention,42 and that
exemption, even if it had no bearing on the right to counsel, illustrated that
the history and function of a particular Sixth Amendment guarantee could
result in excluding a particular charge from its application even though the
“offense” charged was found in the jurisdiction’s “criminal code.”
Justice Black’s opinion stressed the necessity of a lawyer’s assistance in
achieving a fair trial, but the fair trial objective also applied to various

40. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963). Justice Harlan noted that the
overruling of Betts should extend to “at least” such cases. Justice Clark also referred to persons
charged with “serious crimes.” Id. at 347.
41. The Court referred to the right as that of the “accused” in a “criminal prosecution,” id.
at 339, 343, as that of an “indigent criminal defendant,” id. at 340–41, and as that of “one
charged with crime.” Id. at 343 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462–63 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The conference notes attribute to Chief Justice Warren the following
comment: “We should not go all the way and say that a man is entitled to counsel in all criminal
cases . . . .” THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 502.
Justice Black’s opinion also noted that petitioner Gideon had been charged with a noncapital felony, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–45, and subsequent cases, considering the bearing of
pre-Gideon convictions on recidivist charges, referred to Gideon as prohibiting “uncounseled
felony conviction[s].” Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 490 (1972); see United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 448–49 (1972). Immediately after Gideon was decided, it commonly was described as a
ruling applicable “at least [to] felony prosecutions” or to “‘serious’ crime[s].” Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434, 1434 (1965); Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV. 1531, 1561 (1963) (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
42. The petty offense exception had been noted in the Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 17, at
44 n.43, and was noted in the oral argument. See Oral Argument, Part 1, supra note 22, at
46:56. The petty offense exemption is discussed in CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 22.1(b).
Petitioner’s counsel did not suggest adoption of a petty offense limitation, but simply noted its
existence. Abe Krash, one of the lawyers working with Gideon’s appointed counsel (Abe
Fortas), later rejected the petty offense analogy in a law review article. He argued that Gideon
should be applied “in all cases where [the individual] may be deprived of life, or liberty, or
property by criminal process.” Abe Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 150, 157 (1964). This would have encompassed
“infractions”—offenses prosecuted under the criminal rules but subject only to the imposition
of fines. Krash noted, however, that a current Congressional proposal for appointment of
compensated counsel in the federal courts would exclude petty offenses. Id. at 157–58.
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actions instituted by the government that had clearly been defined as civil,
such as a civil forfeiture or civil contempt (indeed, at the time, criminal
contempt was treated differently under the Jury Clause).43 The characteristic
that would identify a “criminal charge” would not be the value of a fair trial
or prosecutorial initiation of the action, but some other aspect of the
government’s cause of action. That could be the potential sanction,44 the
actual sanction,45 the purpose of the cause of action (whether to impose a
“punishment”),46 or even other aspects of procedure (which led to various

43. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 197–200 (1968) (citing and overruling early cases
holding that criminal contempt cases did not require a jury trial). As for due process
requirements for civil forfeiture and civil contempt, see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–34 (1994); CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 26.6(d); Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
44. The potential sanction standard could carry the right far beyond charges under the
state criminal code. Betts had referred to traffic court cases since traffic violations (located in a
separate code) at that time typically carried potential sentences of incarceration and fines that
were viewed as punitive. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942); see CRIMPROC, supra note 1,
§ 1.8(d) & nn.58–60. Justice Stewart asked about the traffic violation in the Gideon oral
argument. See Oral Argument, Part 2, supra note 22, at 50:49. Various regulatory “offenses”
located outside the criminal code also included incarceration as a possible penalty.
45. While Gideon referred to counsel’s assistance being necessary to ensure the “fundamental
human rights of life and liberty,” that reference was not seen as suggesting that charges were not
criminal for Sixth Amendment purposes simply because they involved misdemeanors and the
particular defendant would not be sentenced to a loss of liberty. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)); LIVINGSTON HALL & YALE KAMISAR,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 295–96 (2d ed.1966). The
actual incarceration standard initially was proposed in connection with the recognition that
certain statutes providing for incarceration sentences (e.g., traffic offenses) rarely, if ever,
resulted in that sentence, and for all practical purposes, were simply “infractions.” See John M.
Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 710–11 (1968). To
ensure that the violation had that character in the particular case, it was also necessary that a
sentence of incarceration not be imposed. Of course, the actual incarceration standard
eventually imposed by the Court differed from this proposal because it made the Sixth
Amendment inapplicable to defendants convicted of violations that often do result in
incarceration (and carry the stigma of such offenses), but did not have that consequence in the
particular case. But see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1972); but see Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Unlike many traffic or other
‘regulatory’ offenses, [theft] carries the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes
traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravity.”); Brief of the Nat’l Legal Aid and
Defender Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 13–14, Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (1978) (No. 77-1177), 1978 WL
206722, at *13–14 (arguing that Argersinger should be reconsidered because it denies counsel
based on the “personal [sentencing] philosophy” of the “judge in the case,” so for crimes such
as “possession of marijuana,” there will be no right to counsel before a particular judge
although elsewhere “jail [is] routinely imposed”); Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson,
Scott v. Illinois and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71,
106 (1979) (“If there is any misdemeanor deserving a full panoply of rights due a criminal
accused, it is misdemeanor-theft. A rational argument cannot be made that a defendant
charged with felony-theft can be denied counsel merely because no imprisonment is imposed
upon conviction.”).
46. That has been the focus, in part, of the effort to define an “offense” for double
jeopardy purposes. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 17.4(b) & nn.115–17.
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states classifying ordinance violations as “civil” or “quasi-criminal” even
though they duplicated misdemeanors in content and sanctions).47 I did not
see anything in Gideon providing substantial direction on these alternatives.
When the Court in Scott v. Illinois eventually drew the line by reference to
the defendant’s actual confinement,48 it did not rely on Gideon, and it saw no
need to respond to Justice Brennan’s argument that Gideon necessarily
implied that potential confinement created a criminal prosecution. Gideon
strongly indicated that the right was not limited to felonies, but did no more
than that. Thus, Justices White and Stewart (who had joined the Gideon
opinion) could readily be part of the Scott majority.
B. STARTING POINT/STAGES
At what point in the criminal process does the constitutional right to
counsel attach, and at what steps in the process thereafter does the
defendant have a right to insist upon the participation of that counsel? Prior
to Gideon, the Court had provided at least partial answers to both these
questions in the course of applying the due process right to counsel.
Hamilton v. Alabama had held, in a state capital case, that the right to
representation by appointed counsel extended to a pretrial stage in a
criminal proceeding if it was a “critical stage.”49 That encompassed a stage at
which a basic right could be “irretrievably lost” by failing to assert it.
Hamilton involved a trial arraignment proceeding at which the defense of
insanity was forfeited if not pleaded.50 In White v. Maryland, decided several
weeks before Gideon was argued, that critical stage analysis was extended to a
preliminary hearing at which the uncounseled defendant entered a guilty
plea, which was used against him when he later changed his mind and went
to trial.51 Although these cases spoke to the right to have the advice of
counsel in these proceedings, they implicitly set a starting point for judicial
appointments of counsel as sufficiently in advance of the critical stage
proceeding to provide advice in that proceeding. White was particularly

47. See id. § 17.4(b) & nn.118–40.
48. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74 (majority opinion). This includes sentences that provide
for potential confinement on violation of conditions of the sentence. See CRIMPROC, supra
note 1, § 11.2(a). The actual incarceration standard applies only to misdemeanors. See id.
Appointment in felony cases is not conditioned on an incarceration sentence. See Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994).
49. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961).
50. Justice Douglas’s opinion spoke only of the “arraignment,” but the cited Alabama
cases established that the reference was to the “trial arraignment”—i.e., the arraignment on the
indictment before the trial court, not a first appearance before a magistrate. See CRIMPROC,
supra note 1, § 1.4(g) (noting jurisdictions that refer to the latter proceeding as an
“arraignment on the complaint” or “preliminary arraignment”).
51. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59–60 (1961).
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significant in this regard because it required appointment before the
defendant reached the trial court.52
Although Gideon emphasized the need for counsel to ensure a fair trial,
that reasoning did not alter a critical stage analysis that could include
pretrial proceedings because of their impact on the trial. The critical stage
concept had been derived from Powell v. Alabama’s reference to the need for
the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”53
The same language had been cited by Justice Black in Johnson v. Zerbst, which
established the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.54 Of course the Sixth
Amendment referred to the rights of an “accused.” Neither Hamilton nor
White addressed that term, arguably because it was not critical under due
process analysis, but arguably also because a person who was being asked to
respond to a formal charge quite obviously is an accused.
By adding to the analytical mix the language of the Sixth Amendment,
Gideon might be seen as impacting the question of when the right to
appointment attaches, treating that issue as distinct from what constitutes a
“critical stage.”55 Of course, that addition would not necessarily broaden the
right to counsel, as a due process analysis of what constitutes a critical stage
might include steps in the process that occurred before a defendant became
an “accused.”56 When the Court eventually set a starting point at which the
individual became an accused for Sixth Amendment purposes, in Kirby v.
Illinois,57 it cited as relevant “a line of constitutional cases” starting with
Powell and including Hamilton and White as well as Gideon. There was no
suggestion that Gideon itself was decisive.
Both Hamilton and White involved judicial proceedings, and the starting
point for becoming an accused was also a judicial proceeding (the first
appearance). The Court later concluded that critical stage analysis applied
to non-judicial proceedings involving the accused (e.g., lineups and
government elicitation of statements),58 but here again Gideon was viewed as

52. See id. at 60.
53. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Powell, the original “landmark” ruling on
the right to counsel, was the primary grounding for Gideon’s argument that Betts had been
wrongly decided. See Israel, supra note 1, at 231–38.
54. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
55. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 211–12 (2008); CRIMPROC, supra note
1, § 11.2(b).
56. See Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 485–86 (1964); see also CRIMPROC, supra note 1, §§ 6.4(c), 7.3(b). But see Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 688–90 (1972) (limiting Escobedo and Wade).
57. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688–89; see CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.2(b) nn. 44–48.7.
58. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (requiring notification of right to counsel where lineup is
impending); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (eliciting statements by an
informant).
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not having added substantially to the analysis first developed in the
Hamilton–White line of cases.59
C. THE ASSISTANCE OF EXPERTS
A pre-Gideon ruling had also addressed the question of whether the
Constitution required the state to provide an indigent defendant with the
assistance of a defense expert. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi viewed that
claim as presenting a due process issue that stood apart from the right-tocounsel cases. 60 The Court held that any due process obligation had been
met when the state trial court utilized its own appointed psychiatric expert,
and it therefore could deny defense counsel’s request for a defense
psychiatrist to assist on an insanity defense. Smith’s very brief discussion of
the issue did not consider the bearing of Powell or Johnson v. Zerbst and the
discussion there of the wide range of assistance that could be provided by
court appointed counsel. Gideon’s discussion was similar and no more
relevant to the issue than the Powell and Johnson v. Zerbst discussions.61 When
the Court reexamined Smith in Ake v. Oklahoma,62 it suggested otherwise. Ake
too relied on due process rather than the constitutional right to counsel, but
it held that due process did require appointment of a defense psychiatric
expert when a sufficient showing of relevance was made. The Court noted
that Smith was decided “at a time when indigent defendants in state courts
had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel.”63 Subsequent
rulings in Griffin, its progeny, and in Gideon had “signaled our increased
commitment to assuring meaningful access to the judicial process.”64 In light
of these shifts and other developments (in particular, the “extraordinarily
enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today”), Smith was not binding as
to “whether fundamental fairness today requires a different result.”65

59. In Wade the Court cited the Powell–Hamilton–White line of cases, but did not include
Gideon. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–27. In Kirby, which limited Wade to “accused” persons, the Court
cited Gideon (along with the other cases) in addressing the “attachment” issue. Kirby, 406 U.S. at
688. In Massiah the Court cited Gideon as simply reaffirming Powell, which, in turn, recognized
the need for counsel in pretrial stages. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205.
60. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953); see CRIMPROC, supra
note 1, § 11.2(e) & n.140.
61. This is not to say that those discussions lacked relevancy. See John R. Waltz, Inadequacy
of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 NW. U. L.
REV. 289, 335, 337 (1964) (arguing that Gideon requires reexamination of rulings rejecting the
“claim that adequate legal representation embraces non-legal assistance as well,” since “the
provision of counsel to a poor man may bring only half a defense if the accused is without funds
to employ additional assistance”).
62. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84–85 (1985); see CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.2(e)
& n.142.
63. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Smith had been a capital case, where a constitutional right to counsel
did exist even in state cases.66 That led me to wonder whether the Ake Court
really found in Gideon the establishment of new grounds for rejecting the
perspective that shaped Smith, or simply preferred to refer to later cases that
had undercut that perspective, rather than acknowledge that the Smith
perspective was wrong at the outset. In any event, as to the later cases, Griffin
arguably played the more important role in rejecting disparate treatment of
indigent defendants.
D. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Pre-Gideon precedent also addressed the concept of effective assistance.
Powell v. Alabama, after establishing that the defendants there had a due
process right to appointed counsel, concluded that the right had been
denied because the appointment process had been so “indefinite” (in
initially appointing the entire bar) and “so close upon the trial as to amount
to denial of effective and substantial aid” by counsel.67 Several subsequent
due process cases noted that the defendant was denied the due process right
when a defendant entitled to the assistance of counsel was “force[d] . . . to
trial with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and
assistance of counsel.”68 In Glasser v. United States,69 another pre-Gideon
ruling, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated when the trial court directed a retained defense attorney to also
represent a codefendant, thereby creating a conflict of interest, which led
counsel to forego actions that would have favored only one of the
codefendants. Representation contrary to a defendant’s best interests due to
a conflict of interest denied the disfavored codefendant “his right to have
the effective assistance of counsel.”70

66. Smith was decided in 1953. The capital offense exception was firmly established in
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961), but had been explicitly recognized in dicta in
pre-1953 cases. See Vegas v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 330 U.S.
641, 674 (1948).
67. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
68. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 452
(1940); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278–79 (1945);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (similar analysis rendered unconstitutional state
forfeiture of a claim where state law failed to allow for appointment of counsel in time to
object). In White, the allegations found to be sufficient to require a state response, although
described as raising a claim under the Powell ineffective appointment line of cases, also referred
to various failures by counsel that appeared unrelated to the trial court’s failure to grant a
continuance. White, 324 U.S. at 762–63. However, the Court’s reliance upon cases like Powell,
Avery, and Hawk led to White being read as part of that line of rulings. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
69. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); see CRIMPROC, supra note 1,
§ 11.9(a) n.1.
70. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
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One common characteristic of each of these pre-Gideon rulings was that
the trial court was responsible for the lack of effective representation. As
Sara Mayeux notes in her contribution to this symposium,71 a long line of
common law rulings had rejected claims of ineffective assistance under an
agency doctrine, holding the defendant responsible for his counsel’s
shortcomings.72 As she notes also, Powell had cited in support of its position
state cases that had rejected that agency analysis.73 However, the holdings in
the pre-Gideon cases could be reconciled with the acceptance of traditional
agency analysis because the ineffectiveness there could be attributed to the
state, which arguably caused the agent-attorney’s inadequate representation.
Reliance upon the federal constitutional right to counsel also arguably
brought into play a slightly different limitation that made state responsibility
a critical element of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim (“IAC”).
Constitutional violations require “state action,” and numerous pre-Gideon
lower court rulings had suggested that state action was not present unless a
state actor (most likely the trial court) was somehow responsible for
counsel’s deficient performance.74 Mitchell v. United States, a prominent
opinion by Judge Prettyman of the D.C. Court, noted:
It is clear from these opinions that the term “effective” has been
used by the Supreme Court to describe a procedural requirement,
as contrasted to a standard of skill. . . . It has never used the term to
refer to the quality of the service rendered by a lawyer.75
Mitchell, however, also concluded that due process was violated where
counsel “is so incompetent as to deprive his client of a trial in any real
sense—render the trial a mockery and a farce [as] one descriptive
expression.”76 Of course, such gross incompetence not only rendered the

71. Sara Mayeux, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Before Powell v. Alabama: Lessons from History
for the Future of the Right to Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2161 (2014).
72. This agency doctrine was still being discussed at the time of the Gideon ruling,
although it had been rejected by many courts. See, e.g., Waltz, supra note 61, at 297 (providing
the leading commentary on ineffective assistance at that time).
73. See Mayeux, supra note 71.
74. Waltz, supra note 61, at 297–300 (collecting state action rulings); see also Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, supra note 41, at 1437–38; Note, Effective Assistance
of Counsel, supra note 41, at 1553–58.
75. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Cf. Waltz, supra note 61, at
293–94 (criticizing Judge Prettyman’s reasoning). But see Payton v. Fields, 147 S.E.2d 762, 766
(Va. 1966) (citing the “well-reasoned opinion by Judge Prettyman in Mitchell v. United States”).
76. Mitchell, 259 F.2d at 793.
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appointment a “sham,”77 but could be viewed as a state responsibility, since it
would be apparent to the trial judge.78
Gideon’s emphasis on counsel’s assistance being a necessity in achieving
fair trials arguably required the effective assistance requirement to address
counsel incompetence without regard to state responsibility or trial court
awareness. The responsibility for a “fair trial” lies with the state, and as the
Ninth Circuit noted in a post-Gideon ruling, “effective assistance of counsel is
equally ‘essential to a fair trial’ whether or not the court or the prosecutor
participates directly in depriving the accused of that aid.”79 While “[t]here
may be less reason to charge the State with knowledge of the deficiency,” the
“fundamental unfairness” remains.80 In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
put to rest, in another context, any state action restriction on the character
of the counsel deficiencies constituting ineffective assistance.81 The Court
cited Gideon in support of the principle that the state bore the ultimate
responsibility for the process that resulted in conviction, but it also looked to
pre-Gideon due process cases that supported that principle.82 Cuyler
confirmed my 1963 conclusion that Gideon might well lead to rejection of
the state action restriction, but only as the last in a line of rulings
inconsistent with that restriction.83
Gideon also appeared likely to influence the standard applied in
determining whether counsel’s performance fell short of effective assistance,

77. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (explaining that if a denial of
continuance operated to “convert the appointment of counsel into a sham,” the constitutional
“guarantee of assistance of counsel [would not] be satisfied”).
78. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d. 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (“[A]bsence of effective
representation . . . mean[s] representation so lacking in competence that it becomes the duty
of the court or the prosecution to observe it and to correct it.”).
79. Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1966).
80. Id.
81. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). The question addressed in Cuyler was whether
the state action requirement imposed a different standard for retained counsel, as here the
court was not responsible for the selection of the counsel. A unanimous Court flatly rejected
that contention. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.7(b).
82. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 343. The Court relied on Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–91
(1923), holding that due process was violated where the trial was dominated by the threat of
mob violence, and Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941). Id. In Lisenba, the Court
noted that due process was violated by state use of a confession where “mob violence anterior to
the trial is the inducing cause of the . . . confession.” Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 237. In the mob
violence cases, the trial court presumably is aware of the threat of mob action. A fair trial can
also be denied by jury misconduct, even though the court has no reason to be aware of that
misconduct. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 24.9(f). The ineffective assistance doctrine, in
effect, treats defense attorneys, whether appointed or retained, in the same fashion as jurors.
They are official participants in the administration of the process.
83. Insofar as Gideon’s contribution rested on its recognition of the need for counsel to
ensure a fair trial, that connection dated back to Powell and could have led to rejection of the
state action limitation in cases in which Powell, Betts, or Johnson v. Zerbst required the
appointment of counsel.
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although here again that would be due to analysis grounded in earlier
rulings. Both in describing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
discussing “reason and reflection” as to the importance of counsel, Gideon
emphasized the ultimate objective of ensuring that the defendant receive a
“fair trial.”84 If the right to counsel’s assistance is viewed as an instrumental
right aimed at ensuring a fair trial, it seemed to follow logically that
counsel’s performance would be assessed by reference to whether counsel’s
deficiencies in assistance resulted in the lack of a fair trial.85 While the
unfairness of the adjudication, or the likely unfairness of the adjudication,
would not be the only consideration (e.g., counsel may have had a legitimate
justification, such as the client’s preferences, for inactions resulting in the
lack of a fair trial), that unfairness would be a prerequisite for a finding of
constitutionally deficient assistance.
Prior to Gideon, various lower courts had applied a “fair trial analysis” to
claims of ineffective assistance.86 Commentators complained that this
analysis was just as vague and subjective as the “mockery and farce” analysis
applied by Mitchell and numerous other courts.87 Gideon’s frequent
references to a fair trial did not include a description of the content of
“fairness” for this purpose. However, a possible reference point was a line of
due process cases holding that actions of a prosecutor or trial court had (or
had not) resulted in an unfair trial. In 1963, this meant turning to older
cases such as Moore v. Dempsey88 and Mooney v. Holohan,89 and more recent
cases, such as Thompson v. Louisville90 and Brady v. Maryland91 (decided the
same term as Gideon).

84. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 342–44 (1963). The “essential to a fair
trial” phrasing was used in six different sentences, describing both the character of
fundamental rights and the need for counsel’s assistance. Although the Court referred to the
achievement of a “fair trial,” that reference included fairness in the adjudication of guilt
without a trial. The Court had previously noted that the right to the assistance of counsel
applied to the defendant who pleads guilty, thereby waiving his trial right. See Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
85. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
86. See Waltz, supra note 61, at 305 n.106; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note
41, at 1552.
87. See Waltz, supra note 61, at 304–05; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 41, at
1558 (noting the fair trial standard is “vague both in definition and effect”).
88. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). The trial in Dempsey was dominated by a
mob. Id.
89. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111 (1935). In Mooney, the prosecution knowing
relied on perjured testimony. Id.
90. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). In Thompson, the defendant
was convicted without evidentiary support. Id.
91. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). In Brady, the prosecution failed to disclose
material exculpatory evidence within its possession. Id.
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As I have discussed elsewhere, this line of “fair trial” due process rulings
has continued to grow even after the specific trial rights in the Bill of Rights
were made applicable to the states under selective incorporation.92 Three
characteristics tend to be reflected in the rulings finding that the
adjudication of guilt violated due process because the trial was unfair:
(1) they require a showing that the challenged action had a prejudicial
impact (i.e., altered or likely altered the outcome);93 (2) they examine the
challenged action in light of the circumstances of the individual case;94 and
(3) they evaluate fairness by reference to the basic process objective of
precluding the conviction of the innocent (often the factually innocent but
sometimes the legally innocent).95 In quoting Powell v. Alabama’s discussion
of the need for a lawyer’s assistance, the Gideon opinion arguably recognized
that same objective: “Without [counsel’s assistance], though [the defendant]
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction.”96 The quotation from
Powell also suggested that what was needed for effective assistance would vary
with the circumstances (e.g., although a checklist of defense counsel’s basic
duties might include determining whether “the indictment is good or bad,”
the failure to do so does not necessarily result in the defendant being “put
on trial without a proper charge” and even that does not necessarily lead to
the conviction of a defendant not legally guilty). Of course, Gideon insisted
on a flat rule as to the appointment of counsel, eschewing a case-by-case
analysis, but that differs from a post-conviction analysis where assistance was
provided.97 So too, although the failure to provide counsel required an

92. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s
Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001); CRIMPROC, supra note 1,
§ 2.7(b).
93. See Israel, supra note 92, at 395 n.541 (collecting cases); see also Note, Effective Assistance
of Counsel, supra note 41, at 1558–60 (contending that a “fair trial” analysis would allow for
shifting to the government the burden of showing a lack of prejudice in some circumstances).
94. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 2.7(b) n.80–81 and accompanying text; Israel, supra
note 92, at 396 (noting that other due process rulings announced “a general prohibition of a
particular type of governmental action,” and took the circumstances into account only insofar
as they related to the presence of prejudice).
95. See Israel, supra note 92, at 397 n.549.
96. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). Since Powell referred to counsel’s ability to exclude “incompetent
evidence,” which could include evidence excluded on grounds other than suspect reliability,
the reference to “innocence” and being “not guilty” presumably refers to legal innocence as
opposed to factual innocence. That however, was not entirely clear, as evidenced by United States
v. Cronic’s reference discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 104–10, to discovery of the
truth as the “ultimate objective” of the adversary process that requires the assistance of counsel.
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 862 (1975)).
97. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (opinion of
Leventhal, J.) (noting this distinction). Consider also the opinion of Judge MacKinnon that the
term “ineffectiveness” suggests reference to the actual impact of counsel’s performance. Id. at
222 (opinion of MacKinnon, J.).
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automatic reversal of a conviction, attempting to assess the impact of the
total absence of counsel was quite different from assessing the impact of
specific actions or inactions alleged to have produced constitutionally
deficient representation.98
The Gideon opinion did describe counsel’s assistance as an essential
element of “our adversary system of criminal justice,”99 and it implicitly
pointed to adversary-process concerns when it noted that the state would be
represented by a lawyer. It did not take the further step, however, of
characterizing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a mandated
structural component of the adversary process, similar to other Sixth
Amendment rights (in particular the confrontation and compulsory process
clause). It stressed the fair trial objection, and a properly functioning
adversary process was part of that focus, as its objective of adjudicative
reliability certainly is a major element of a fair trial. Gideon did not suggest
that anything more was involved, although the adversary process has been
described as having an additional attribute—”respect[ing] individual
autonomy and reflect[ing] the proper relationship between the individual
and the state.”100 From that perspective, the assistance of counsel is designed
to go beyond ensuring that the trial is “fair”—i.e., beyond ensuring that the
defense is able to present evidence, challenge the prosecution evidence, and
raise legal objections, thereby producing a result that is both reliable and
consistent with the protection of the legally innocent. The adversary process
provides the defendant with a “champion,” whose obligations include taking
advantage of whatever the process allows to achieve a result favorable to the
defendant. This standard of zealous representation could require an analysis
of defense counsel’s capacity to perform and actual performance that goes
beyond asking whether counsel’s alleged deficiencies deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. It could conceivably lead to a definition of
effectiveness requiring that counsel had the time and resources needed to
utilize the process to the defendant’s advantage and then made a significant
effort to do exactly that. As United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez101 explained in
distinguishing the right to counsel of choice from the right to effective
assistance, the focus would be on the right specified (to a counsel able to
serve, and actually serving, as an effective defense advocate), rather than

98. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–59 (identifying special situations in which deficient
performance is likely to have such a pervasive influence as to justify a presumption of prejudice,
similar to that applied to the “complete denial of counsel”).
99. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
100. See CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 1.5(c).
101. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (holding that the
erroneous denial of right to counsel of choice required automatic conviction reversal and
rejecting the government’s argument that reversal was required only if “prejudice” could be
established under the standard applied to IAC claims).
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whether “the trial is, on the whole, fair.”102 In 1963, I concluded that this
additional characteristic of adversary representation was completely missing
from the Gideon discussion. That was to be expected from an opinion that
focused on explaining why the Betts due process opinion (which quite
naturally had a “fair trial” focus) had been incorrectly decided under the
ground rules that then governed due process analysis.103
In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its two seminal rulings on the IAC
claim, United States v. Cronic104 and Strickland v. Washington.105 The
conventional wisdom is that these rulings largely undermined the “promise”
of Gideon.106 Yet, the reasoning of both opinions can be tied directly to the
reasoning of Gideon. Cronic points out that “the right to effective assistance of
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on
the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.”107 This fair trial focus, in
turn, leads the Cronic Court to conclude that an IAC claim ordinarily
requires a case-specific showing of likely prejudicial impact. The Cronic
Court does offer an adversary system benchmark for assessing counsel’s
performance, but it does so by reference to an adversary system aimed at

102. Id. at 145. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Gonzalez-Lopez Court majority stressed that
“the right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has never been derived from the Sixth
Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial.” Id. at 147–48. That distinguished the IAC claim,
which included a prejudice element. That element was attributed to the IAC claim having
historical roots in due process (Powell v. Alabama) and being grounded in the Sixth
Amendment’s general objective of ensuring a fair trial.
103. In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court also drew a distinction between a right that commands
“that a trial be fair” and a right commanding “that a particular guarantee of fairness be
provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” Id. at
146. As the Court had noted in addressing the confrontation clause, where a particular
procedure has been prescribed by a constitutional provision, though that procedure has been
prescribed to serve the overall purpose of achieving a fair trial, it does not follow that the failure
to adhere to that procedure “can be disregarded so long as the trial is . . . fair.” Id. at 145–46.
Gideon, because it responded to Betts and relied heavily on Powell, did not seek to describe the
assistance of counsel as a prescribed structural element of the adversary system. Even if Gideon
had done so, United States v. Cronic indicates that, for the issue of effectiveness, the overall
fairness of the proceeding would remain relevant. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. Cronic referred to
representation by counsel as “a fundamental component of our criminal justice system,” but still
looked to overall objective of the guarantee in assessing performance. Id. at 653.
104. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648.
105. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
106. Thus, numerous commentators have noted that Strickland “gutted Gideon by allowing
anyone with a warm body and a law degree to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” Abbe Smith,
Gideon Was A Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass Incarceration, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1363, 1385 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Richard Klein, The
Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1999); and the
various articles collected in CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.10(a) n.16.
107. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
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implementing the fair trial objective by advancing the “truth-seeking
function of trials.”108
Strickland builds upon that adversary system benchmark in articulating a
two-pronged analysis of counsel’s performance. When it came to describing
the potential for prejudice, Strickland turns to two cases applying
freestanding due process in the fair trial context.109
That was certainly consistent with what would have been predicted in
1963,110 although neither prong of the Strickland standard was necessarily
dictated by Gideon.
Neither Cronic nor Strickland relied heavily on Gideon, and Justice
Marshall did not do so either in his dissent in Strickland. Gideon did not
address the content of ineffective assistance, and while its reasoning
arguably pointed toward the eventual rejection of the “mockery and farce”
standard and the state action limitation, the end results produced in Cronic
and Strickland certainly were a distinct possibility. On this Sixth Amendment
issue, as with the others I explored, Gideon did not promise more than we
eventually received. Indeed, even if the “promise” of Gideon was tied to the
perceived inclinations of the liberal core of the nine Justices who overruled
Betts (Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
Goldberg), it arguably was misplaced. Justice Brennan joined the Court’s
opinion in both Cronic and Strickland (although dissenting from the
Strickland judgment because it failed to vacate a death sentence).
In 1963, Gideon was destined to play an important role in the further
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, but it was not the role of giving
significant direction to the resolution of those issues. Without Gideon, in
state cases those issues would be faced only after initially concluding that
special circumstances granted the defendant a constitutional right to
appointed counsel. After Gideon, at least in all felony cases, the special
circumstances issue was eliminated and lower courts would be forced to
address the Sixth Amendment issues. That was a significant step and the
overruling of Betts was a significant step, but from my perspective those steps
fell short of making Gideon an instant “landmark ruling.”
My mistake at the time was looking at Gideon only in terms of its
immediate practical impact and its potential doctrinal contributions. I

108. Id. at 655 n.14 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977)). As to the
Court’s adversary system “touchstone,” see CRIMPROC, supra note 1, § 11.7(c).
109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Strickland adopted a “reasonable probability” standard
based on two cases: (1) United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), a case applying the
Brady v. Maryland due process obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence (see supra
note 91); and (2) United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982), a case assessing
the prosecutor’s due process responsibilities where a potential witness is made unavailable to
the defense by the governmental action of deporting the witness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
110. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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missed its symbolic impact. That was not true of others. Justice Mitchell D.
Schweitzer of the New York Supreme Court noted:
Future treatises on constitutional and criminal law will surely deem
Gideon v. Wainwright a landmark decision, but in all probability,
they will do so not because of its direct, but rather because of its
indirect, effects. When the Supreme Court finally overruled Betts v.
Brady, few indeed were the states which, in reliance upon it, refused
to assign counsel to an indigent defendant charged with a serious
crime. Thus, Gideon changed the law (or at least the practice) in
very few states. What Gideon has done, however, is to focus the
nation’s attention upon the fundamental importance of the right
to counsel in a criminal case. Even more significantly, it has
prompted the legal profession to reexamine the procedures by
which that right is afforded to an indigent defendant.111
Justice Schweitzer was correct in both respects. He recognized, as I did
not, that Gideon furnished the organized bar with exactly the right storyline
to vigorously push for dramatic reform of the method for providing legal
assistance to indigent defendants and for funding that assistance. Of course,
writing in 1965, he had the advantage of being aware of that storyline
because of Anthony Lewis’ compelling Gideon’s Trumpet.112 It is that storyline
and the message Lewis conveys about equal justice and the value of a good
lawyer that has made Gideon what it is today.

111. Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Book Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 184 (1965) (footnotes
omitted).
112. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964). The book was later made into a popular
made-for-TV movie starring Henry Fonda and José Ferrer. See Gideon’s Trumpet (CBS television
broadcast Apr. 30, 1980).

